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Evolutionary linguistics and historical pragmatics can inform each other on a theoretical as
well as on a methodological level. This paper introduces a computational model to study the
impact of pragmatic factors on language evolution and change. It explores the validity of the
frequently cited statement that ‘[i]t would not be entirely inappropriate to regard languages in
their diachronic aspects as gigantic expression-compacting machines’ (Langacker, 1977, 107).
In particular, I advocate a model of language that includes a coding aspect as well as an in-
ferential aspect, and demonstrate how these two aspects interact with each other through the
processes of underspecification and overspecification. The developed model exemplifies how
language makes use of lossy compression to adapt to its environment, and how ambiguity func-
tions as a necessary prerequisite for language evolution. By applying the modelled processes
to study the origins of language, a new account of protolanguage is put forward to complement
the existing approaches to the issue.
1. Introduction
Recent years have seen the emergence of two new interdisciplinary linguistic sub-
fields: evolutionary linguistics and historical pragmatics. While evolutionary lin-
guistics is concerned with the origins and evolution of language, historical prag-
matics, or at least one major branch of it, focuses on the impact of pragmatic
factors on language change. It is one aim of this paper to show how the introduc-
tion of pragmatic factors can also have a substantial effect on models of language
evolution.
However, it is not only historical pragmatics that can inform evolutionary lin-
guistics. The exchange can be seen as working both ways. Both, historical prag-
matics as well as evolutionary linguistics share a data problem. The object of
study of evolutionary linguistics, the origins of language, is simply too far remote
in the past to have provided any record or evidence (Cangelosi & Parisi, 2001).
∗This paper was presented at the Linguistics Association of Great Britain Annual Meeting (LAGB
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Historical pragmatics on the other side, like any branch of pragmatics, is primarily
interested in processes and phenomena that are centred in spoken language. But
spoken language of the historical past cannot be investigated through direct ob-
servation, since our present-day recording techniques were not available in earlier
times (Jacobs & Jucker, 1995). Evolutionary linguistics has found ways to over-
come its data problem to a certain extent by developing computational models
(Cangelosi & Parisi, 2001). This paper exemplifies how such models can equally
be used to formalise and test theories assigned to historical pragmatics, concerned
with the impact of pragmatic factors on language change.
In particular, I will evaluate the frequently cited statement by Langacker
(1977, 107) that ‘[i]t would not be entirely inappropriate to regard languages in
their diachronic aspects as gigantic expression-compacting machines’ in the light
of pragmatic factors influencing language evolution and change.
In the remainder of this paper, I will introduce the articulation bottleneck as a
constraint on language evolution and explain why this property of language neces-
sitates an extension of the model of language typically adopted in evolutionary lin-
guistics by the introduction of context (sections 2 and 3). I will then describe two
central processes in such a model: underspecification (section 4) and overspecifi-
cation (section 5), and show how they allow language to adapt to its environment.
Special attention will be given to the evolutionary role of ambiguity, both in the
original and in the extended model of language (section 6). The paper concludes
with an application of the developed processes to questions of the emergence of
protolanguage (section 7) and a summary of the findings and the main claims that
can be derived from them (section 8).
2. The articulation bottleneck
Numerous studies in evolutionary linguistics are concerned with bottlenecks in
language. More specifically, they typically look at the evolutionary dynamics aris-
ing from one particular bottleneck, namely the learning bottleneck (e.g. Hurford,
2002; Smith, Kirby, & Brighton, 2003). The learning bottleneck is a description
of the fact that language has to be learned repeatedly: each generation of speakers
learns their language from the previous generation. In order to persist, language
therefore has to be learnable—and has evolved to do so, as some studies suggest
(Brighton, Kirby, & Smith, 2005)—in order to pass the learning bottleneck.
In this article, however, I will focus on another, equally fundamental bottle-
neck: the articulation bottleneck. The articulation bottleneck is the property of
language that it transmits messages through a serial channel, speech. Levinson
(1995, 95f.) identifies articulation as a ‘relatively slow and inefficient process,
which acts as a bottleneck in the entire communicative procedure’. To provide
evidence, he mentions that we can think faster than we can speak, that we can
easily understand pitch-corrected speech at double speed, and that we can scan a
printed page far faster than it can be read aloud. It is the process of articulation that
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slows down the transmission system of human verbal communication. This fact
is reflected in various principles and heuristics introduced by pragmatists, ranging
from the well-known conversational maxims ‘Do not make you contribution more
informative than is required’ and ‘Be brief’ (Grice, 1975) to the assertion that ‘[i]t
will pay to say little and infer much’ (Levinson, 1995, 96). However, the articula-
tion bottleneck is first and foremost a physical and information-theoretic condition
of language: in order to be transmitted via speech, elements of meaning have to
be transformed—i.e. compressed—into information-bearing units of form.
Two caveats seem to be required at this point. First, the articulation bottleneck
must not be confused with another concept of a similar name, the ‘ease of articu-
lation’. The ease of articulation is a physiological property that may but need not
lead to a compression of the signal, and therefore does not stand in a direct relation
to the articulation bottleneck. The second distinction we have to be aware of is that
of signal simplicity as opposed to code simplicity. The articulation bottleneck con-
ditions the compression of the speech signal, rather than that of the language code
or its grammar. The evolutionary role of the latter has been discussed elsewhere
(e.g. Brighton, 2003), and the related notions of representational economy and
processing economy are particularly popular in the generativist literature. Lan-
gacker (1977) provides an extensive discussion of the distinction between signal
simplicity and code simplicity.
3. Compression and the code model of language
In the previous section, we have seen that the articulation bottleneck is the con-
dition that requires language to transform elements of meaning into elements of
form to transmit them via speech. This is a process of data compression. Informa-
tion theory distinguishes two basic types of compression (Sayood, 2006). Lossless
compression tries to minimise statistical redundancy in a signal. It can be realised,
for instance, by using shorter words for more frequent meanings. Within linguis-
tic phenomena, Zipf’s law (Zipf, 1936) and anaphora are examples that fall under
the category of lossless compression.
A far greater compression rate, however, can be achieved by so-called lossy
compression. Lossy compression seeks to minimise perceptual redundancy. This
can be done by omitting information, or elements of meaning, which are either
imperceptible or inferable from the context.a Lossy compression is thus relative
to context. To discover if lossy compression is at work in language, we must
therefore include the notion of context in our model of language.
Information theory—and to a large extent evolutionary linguistics too—
typically adheres to a mere code model of language. Language is conceived as a
aIn the technical domain, lossy compression is applied, for instance, in TV signals, where colour
information that cannot be perceived by the human eye is not transmitted, or similarly in the file
formats of JPEG and MPEG (Sayood, 2006).
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code, and verbal communication accordingly as encoding and decoding of mean-
ing. One problem with the code model of language is that of ambiguity (Hoefler,
2006). If we adopt a conception of language as a mere code, then ambiguity would
seem to be a dysfunctional feature. In an optimal code, one must assume, one sig-
nal corresponds to exactly one meaning. Furthermore, the fact that there is such an
apparent imperfection in language poses another problem, namely an evolution-
ary one: why has an apparently dysfunctional feature like ambiguity emerged and
managed to persist in language? Is it an adaptation of language to some condition
we have not been aware of so far, or is it a side-effect of some other property of
language? And given our previous considerations, we must also ask if the problem
actually persists if we go beyond the code model of language.
It is thus for two reasons that we want to transcend the mere code model
of language. First, we want to introduce the notion of context to see if lossy
compression can be observed to be at work in language. Second, we hope to
overcome the evolutionary problem that ambiguity poses.
Proponents of the code model of language have frequently pointed out that
language is essentially a set of mappings from meaning to form (e.g. Pinker &
Bloom, 1990). And also those who hold the code model for insufficient and in-
complete do not question that language does contain a coding part (Sperber &
Wilson, 1995, 9). It is thus safe to define the first two building blocks of our
model as an inventory of elements of meaning and an inventory of elements of
form. In language, elements of meanings comprise lexical meanings (e.g. TREE,
TOP, ...) and grammatical functions (e.g. PLURAL, PAST, ...). In our model, we
represent them as lower-case letters (a, b, c, ...). Elements of form, on the other
side, correspond to the information-bearing units of form such as phonemes, tone,
or word order. In our model, we implement just two abstract units of form, namely
the binary numbers 0 and 1. A language user’s grammar or code will therefore
consist of a set of constructions, which are mappings from a number of elements
of meaning onto a number of elements of form.
In a code model of language, constructions are used by the speaker to encode
a meaning he or she wants to communicate in a signal. And they are likewise used
by the hearer to decode the transmitted signal and retrieve the intended meaning.
Fig. 1 illustrates this process.
4. Underspecification
Having established the basic coding part of our model of language, we can now
move on to including context. Context can be described as a cognitive environ-
ment shared by speaker and hearer consisting of a set of facts which are percepti-
ble or inferable. Sperber and Wilson (1995, 15f.) point out that context contains
more than just information about the immediate physical environment and infor-
mation about the immediately preceding utterances. Our conception of context
must include, among other things, notions such as world knowledge (including
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76 5401 23Meaningab

76 5401 23Meaningab
a → 0
b → 1
Speaker
// 01Signal //
a → 0
b → 1
Hearer
OO
Figure 1. Communication in a code model of language. Both, the speaker’s and the hearer’s language
code contain the two constructions a→ 0 and b→ 1. Using these constructions, the speaker encodes
the intended meaning ab and produces the corresponding signal 01. The hearer decodes the transmitted
signal and thus recovers the intended meaning ab.
76 5401 23Meaningab

Context
b
!!}}
76 5401 23Meaningab
a → 0
b → 1
Speaker
// 0Signal //
a → 0
b → 1
Hearer
OO
Figure 2. Underspecification. The speaker wants to communicate meaning ab. Since b is in the
context, either directly perceptible or inferable given a, the intended meaning ab can be underspecified,
and thus compressed lossily, by only encoding a and omitting b. The speaker rightly assumes that the
hearer will be able to restore the intended meaning by decoding the signal for a and inferring b from
the context.
linguistic knowledge), general cultural assumptions, and believes about the state
of mind of the speaker or hearer. In our model, context accordingly consists of
a set of elements of meanings which are understood as being either perceptible
or inferable. If a speaker wants to express a meaning ab, he or she can now un-
derspecify their signal if b is either directly perceptible in the context or inferable
from it given a. In either way, the speaker can achieve a minimisation of the signal
by confining himself to encoding a and assuming that the hearer will be capable
of inferring b from context. This process of underspecification is illustrated in Fig
2.
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Underspecification thus yields compressed signals by omitting information
relative to context. We can therefore identify it as the way language applies lossy
compression. Underspecification underlies a vast number of linguistic phenomena
linked to the elliptical nature of speech or the vagueness of language.
If the same type of underspecification occurs frequently in similar contexts,
a new construction ab → 0 is added to the language. The inferred part of the
intended meaning becomes codified and can now be directly accessed in the code.
This process is generally known as conventionalisation. In a computer simula-
tion, the newly codified construction can be added to the grammar of the speaker
or of the hearer, depending on what class of models of language one favours. If
one intends to emphasise the role of learning, one might add the construction as
a newly acquired part to the language of the hearer. Linguists who prefer usage-
based models, on the other side, will identify the same process as entrenchment
or routinisation and locate the addition of the new construction in the speaker.
For the purpose of describing language change, the latter type of models can in
fact completely ignore the hearer and just focus on the innovations created by the
speaker when producing signals. Whichever model one prefers, as far as the evo-
lution and changing of language is concerned, the result is the same. Both variants
are thus equivalent for our purposes, and conventionalisation will be represented
in the speaker’s as well as in the hearer’s grammar in this paper.
We have seen that underspecification is language applying lossy compression.
We can now state that conventionalisation is the way language adapts to its envi-
ronment. This environment, however, must not be confused with the context of an
individual utterance. The environment of language is rather a complex constella-
tion of parameters consisting of the frequencies with which individual elements of
meaning occur in contexts and the frequencies with which they occur in meanings
speakers want to express. Furthermore, these frequency distributions are them-
selves subject to change. Language constantly adapts to a dynamic environment
and will therefore not reach a state where it remains static.
As a summary of our findings so far, we can state that Langacker accurately
describes the interaction of language code and context when he claims that ‘[i]t
would not be entirely inappropriate to regard languages in their diachronic as-
pects as gigantic expression-compacting machines’. It is underspecification and
subsequent conventionalisation that perform this function. Our findings are cor-
roborated by studies in the expression minimisation and grammaticalisation of
individual languages (e.g. Li, 2002).
5. Overspecification
It has been shown that compression without counterbalance reduces the expressiv-
ity of a language to its ultimate collapse (Brighton & Kirby, 2001), and historical
linguists have pointed out that the pressure for simplicity or economy is counter-
vailed by a pressure for transparency or expressivity (Langacker, 1977).
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ac → 0
b → 1
Speaker
// 0Signal //
ac → 0
b → 1
Hearer
OO
Figure 3. Overspecification. The speaker intends to express the meaning a but has only access to
constructions encoding ac and b. Given that it can be inferred from context that c is not the case, the
intended meaning can be overspecified by transmitting the signal encoding ac. The hearer will decode
the transmitted signal as meaning ac but, since it can be inferred from the context that c cannot be the
case, recover the right meaning a.
In our model, this second driving-force can be observed in a situation where
a speaker intends to express a meaning a but has only access to constructions for
ac and b, as illustrated in Fig. 3. The original meaning a can be encoded in an
overspecified way, using the signal for ac instead, if it can be inferred from the
context that c is not the case. The speaker assumes that the hearer will decode the
transmitted signal as meaning ac but will also infer from the context that c does
not hold and therefore be capable of recovering the intended meaning a. Like
underspecification, overspecification is a general process that underlies a large
number of linguistic phenomena. Maybe the most prominent among them occurs
when a lexeme is used in a novel metaphorical way.
In fact, the element c need not even be negated in the context. It will suffice if
it is just irrelevant. The speaker and the hearer will ignore it. The conventionali-
sation of this type of overspecification is known as bleaching, where a morpheme
looses parts of its meaning that have become unimportant.
6. Ambiguity and contextual plasticity
In Fig. 3, the introduction of the newly conventionalised construction a → 0
will obviously lead to an ambiguous situation, where 0 is mapped onto ac as well
as onto the more general meaning a. One might argue that one of the two con-
structions will end up to be used less frequently and eventually disappear from
that language, thus rendering an unambiguous situation again. However, linguis-
tic evidence shows that this is not always the case. In fact, layering, the state
where an older and a newer meaning for the same form coexist, is a frequently
observed phenomenon (e.g. Hopper & Traugott, 1993, 124–126). Fig. 4 shows
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M → tbgt
Speaker
// tbgt
Signal
//
M → tbgt
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OO
Figure 4. Under- and overspecification combined. In the initial code, TO BE GOING TO (tbgt) denotes
physical movement (M ) only. However, it can be inferred from the context that physical movement
implies intention (I|M ), and that physical movement cannot be part of the communicated message
(¬M ). Trying to express intention (I), the speaker overspecifies by transmitting the signal for physi-
cal movement, assuming that the hearer will be able to infer from the context that physical movement
cannot be what the speaker is communicating. At the same time, the speaker underspecifies by as-
suming that the hearer can infer the intention part from the context once he has decoded the signal for
physical movement. Conventionalisation will lead to an (ambiguous) situation of layering, where tbgt
is mapped onto M as well as onto I .
how the processes of under- and overspecification can have led to such a situation
of layering in the English expression TO BE GOING TO.
However, the crucial point is that conventionalisation can only take place if
language allows for ambiguity. If our model prevented ambiguous states, novel
interpretations of a signal could not be codified. The possibility for ambiguity is
a necessary prerequisite for conventionalisation. Without it, there would thus be
no evolution of the coding part of language in the way we have just described in a
model of language that consists of a coding aspect and an inferential aspect.
We have also seen that the two aspects of language are not isolated but interact
with each other through under- and overspecification, which together constitute a
property of language I propose to call contextual plasticity. This concept is related,
but not identical, to notions such as ‘loose talk’ (Sperber & Wilson, 1995, 233ff.)
or ‘pragmatic polysemy’ (Traugott & Dasher, 2005, 11ff.). Contextual plasticity
works by shifting elements of meaning into the code through conventionalisation
of underspecification, or by going the opposite way when conventionalising over-
specification (Fig. 5).
7. From contextual plasticity to protolanguage
Can we apply the described processes to studying the origins of language or its
very early stages, which are usually called protolanguage? It seems intuitive to
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Inferential Aspect
of Language
Underspecification // Coding Aspect
of LanguageOverspecification
oo
Figure 5. Contextual plasticity. Language exhibits contextual plasticity in the fact that it consists of
a coding aspect and an inferential aspect, and that these two aspects interact with each other via under-
and overspecification. Conventionalisation of underspecification brings about a shift of elements of
meaning into the coding part (codification), whereas conventionalisation of overspecification has the
opposite effect.
propose an initial, pre-language situation that only knows the inferential aspect
but does not include a code yet. We have seen above that the mechanism we need
in order to shift elements of meaning from the inferential aspect of language into
the code is underspecification. We must therefore assume a situation of maxi-
mal underspecification. Such a situation will be one in which the whole intended
meaning can be inferred from the context. All a speaker will then have to do to
communicate that meaning is to claim the hearer’s attention, assuming that, once
he or she will have managed to have the hearer’s attention and once they will
therefore share a cognitive environment, the hearer will be able to infer from the
context what the hearer intends to communicate. This is in line with Sperber and
Wilson (1995) who sate that communicating is claiming an individual’s attention.
Fig. 6(a) represents the described situation in our model.
At this pre-language stage, speaker and hearer do not have any codified lan-
guage yet but rely on an inventory of simple signals to claim each other’s attention
that are not mapped onto any meaning. Likewise, it appears to be rather counter-
intuitive to speak of conventionalisation at this early stage of language evolution.
But it can be assumed that language users will be capable of memorising the situ-
ations in which particular attention claimers occurred and therefore of associating
communicated meanings with individual signals. Storing such associations, how-
ever, is equivalent to having a code in that overspecification can be applied to
them just as it would be applied to a code. Under the right conditions—i.e. if
all elements of such a stored meaning the speaker does not want to express are
negated in the context—an overspecified signal can now be transmitted and con-
ventionalisation can apply, as illustrated in Fig. 6(b). Our computer simulations
confirm that the evolution of the language code can indeed take off the ground if
these conditions are met.
As opposed to the holistic approach to protolanguage (Wray, 1998), which
assumes an initial state of complex signals denoting complex meanings, and the
synthetic approach (Bickerton, 1990, 2003), beginning from simple signals stand-
ing for simple meanings, our approach—we may call it inferential—proposes an
initial situation in which simple signals (attention claimers that are not mapped
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0
1
Speaker
// 0Signal //
0
1
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OO
(a)
76 5401 23Meaninga
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0
1
abc → 0
Speaker
// 0Signal //
0
1
abc → 0
Hearer
OO
(b)
Figure 6. Protolanguage. (a) Maximal underspecification. Speaker and hearer do not have a codified
language yet but are equipped with an inventory of attention claimers which are not mapped onto
any meaning (0, 1). Communication happens by the speaker claiming the hearer’s attention and the
hearer inferring what the speaker intends to communicate from context. (b) The situation in which the
previous attention claimer occurred has been memorised, and the signal associated with the meanings
communicated in that situation. Overspecification is applied to the stored association to express a
novel, less specific meaning.
onto any meaning) initialise the inference of maximally underspecified rich mean-
ings and are subsequently associated with them. Language then moves easily to
signals denoting simpler, more general meanings through the process of overspec-
ification.
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8. Conclusion
I have begun this paper by discussing bottlenecks in language evolution. Rather
than looking at the extensively studied learning bottleneck, this paper focuses on
the evolutionary dynamics arising from the articulation bottleneck, the property of
language that it transmits thoughts via a serial channel, speech. Considering no-
tions of compression as described in information theory, we have seen that lossy
compression, which achieves higher compression rates than lossless compression,
is relative to context. We have therefore extended our model of language from
a mere code model to one that consists of a coding part as well as an inferential
part. I have illustrated how these two aspects of language interact with each other
through contextual plasticity, i.e. through the processes of under- and overspeci-
fication. While ambiguity appears the be a dysfunctional property in a mere code
model of language, it is a necessary prerequisite for the evolution of language
in our extended model. Finally, I have sketched how contextual plasticity can
be applied to a new understanding of the processes involved in the emergence of
protolanguage and the subsequent evolution of a linguistic code. To conclude, I
propose that
• if we adopt a model of language that includes a coding aspect as well as an
inferential aspect,
• and if we allow these two aspects to interact through contextual plasticity,
• then we are able to observe how language adapts to its environment through
lossy compression,
• and we can dissolve the evolutionary problem that ambiguity poses in a
mere code model of language.
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